Sam Altman, Dario Amodei, Demis Hassabis and many others have signed a letter urging Congress to increase security on orders of synthetic nucleic acids - and the equipment needed to make them - as models continue to become increasingly bio-capable.
Sam Altman, Dario Amodei, and Demis Hassabis urge Congress to mandate screening of synthetic nucleic acids to prevent AI biosecurity risks
The proposed rules also target physical DNA manufacturing equipment.
Many users dismissed AI leaders urging Congress to mandate screening for synthetic nucleic acids as regulatory capture or CEO fearmongering, while some praised it as a substantive safety step.
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SITUATION DETECTED: Sam Altman, Dario Amodei, and Demis Hassabis have signed a joint open letter calling on Congress to mandate screening of synthetic nucleic acid orders, citing AI’s rapidly improving ability to assist with biological research as an urgent biosecurity risk.
shit is getting real
Sam Altman, Dario Amodei, Demis Hassabis and many others have signed a letter urging Congress to increase security on orders of synthetic nucleic acids - and the equipment needed to make them - as models continue to become increasingly bio-capable.
I am honored to have signed on to this letter. This is an urgent priority for near-term action by Congress. Biotech is advancing rapidly on its own, and I—and many others—believe the “Mythos moment” in AI/bio is coming soon. It is time for action.
Sam Altman, Dario Amodei, Demis Hassabis and many others have signed a letter urging Congress to increase security on orders of synthetic nucleic acids - and the equipment needed to make them - as models continue to become increasingly bio-capable.
OpenAI, DeepMind, Anthropic CEOs back mandatory DNA synthesis screening
A coalition of AI leaders, synthesis-industry executives, biosecurity researchers, and former national-security officials published an open letter in June 2026 urging Congress to make screening and recordkeeping of synthetic nucleic acid orders mandatory in the US, arguing that rapidly improving AI is eroding the knowledge barriers that have historically kept bad actors from building biological weapons.
Signatories - including Demis Hassabis, Sam Altman, Dario Amodei, and Nobel laureate David Baker - frame screening as a well-understood, low-disruption measure already practiced voluntarily by major providers, and call for action this congressional session plus consistent state-level standards.
In case it isn't obvious, this is a slam dunk obviousness necessary (although insufficient) step that should have ~100% support and we need to just do it already.
Sam Altman, Dario Amodei, Demis Hassabis and many others have signed a letter urging Congress to increase security on orders of synthetic nucleic acids - and the equipment needed to make them - as models continue to become increasingly bio-capable.
This is good! I started red teaming LLMs for biorisks/weapons risks in my bedroom in Nov 2022.
In 2023 a lot of people said we were overreacting -- 'models won't be better than internet search'. True then, but the important point is they were going to get a lot better.
Now I think there's clear reason for caution. The ultimate solution is inventing + deploying biodefenses. This is one step.
I fully expect humanity to conquer pandemics in the 21st century
Sam Altman, Dario Amodei, Demis Hassabis and many others have signed a letter urging Congress to increase security on orders of synthetic nucleic acids - and the equipment needed to make them - as models continue to become increasingly bio-capable.

WSJ coverage:
Great. Now you've told the terrorists what to buy, while not having implemented anything to prevent or trace it.
Sam Altman, Dario Amodei, Demis Hassabis and many others have signed a letter urging Congress to increase security on orders of synthetic nucleic acids - and the equipment needed to make them - as models continue to become increasingly bio-capable.

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/top-ai-ceos-call-for-law-protecting-against-biological-weapons-88f2f99f
One of my core tenants is that we need to prepare for a world where Ai capabilities are widely diffused, and this means carefully understanding other bottlenecks (than the AI models) to ensure safety.
Happy to sign this and it’s an honor to be listed by so many of my role models.
Sam Altman, Dario Amodei, Demis Hassabis and many others have signed a letter urging Congress to increase security on orders of synthetic nucleic acids - and the equipment needed to make them - as models continue to become increasingly bio-capable.
@logangraham >I fully expect humanity to conquer pandemics in the 21st century
We shall conquer death.
This is good! I started red teaming LLMs for biorisks/weapons risks in my bedroom in Nov 2022.
In 2023 a lot of people said we were overreacting -- 'models won't be better than internet search'. True then, but the important point is they were going to get a lot better.
Now I think there's clear reason for caution. The ultimate solution is inventing + deploying biodefenses. This is one step.
I fully expect humanity to conquer pandemics in the 21st century

Many of my mutuals are also signatories, congratulations to all of them.
revisions to existing nucleic acid screening requirements were mandated by an EO POTUS signed a year ago; I worked on them while in govt. I genuinely don’t know what happened to that work after I left but it is nine months behind schedule. Congress acting is better anyway.
I am honored to have signed on to this letter. This is an urgent priority for near-term action by Congress. Biotech is advancing rapidly on its own, and I—and many others—believe the “Mythos moment” in AI/bio is coming soon. It is time for action.

@QRDL @Sean_Sooch18 From the red team report: https://red.anthropic.com/2026/mythos-preview/

@AndrewCurran_ Looks like a win for safety on paper but appears to be a result of acc in actual practice. Losing faith in agency of the safety position. Doesn't appear to be politically attainable even if it's desirable. This is ahead of schedule imo
This is obviously a good idea, but has limited shelflife.
What’s the plan for when AI can build this equipment from scratch?
Sam Altman, Dario Amodei, Demis Hassabis and many others have signed a letter urging Congress to increase security on orders of synthetic nucleic acids - and the equipment needed to make them - as models continue to become increasingly bio-capable.

@Sean_Sooch18 Yes, we are speeding up. The emergent capabilities of Mythos class+ will include bio even if they don't train for it.

Andrew, I signed, this is important work - but we need to be really careful to not get distracted from the bigger problem of rapidly decentralizing capabilities to create / deploy biothreats. Detection, identification, response - globally and persistent/pervasive - should be the top priority.
DNA synth will be distributed, it won’t be centralized in a way that can be effective with this approach. Desktop, at home, new synthesis tech coming, etc. Not to mention we can’t regulate China, etc. and this is a globally distributed technology.
This kind of legislation is sort of like telling people not to write viruses on all their home computers or, worse, if they do we will monitor them all to see what they type (which people would get around of course). Important now, not practical in medium/long run.
Necessary to reduce some risk, not nearly sufficient… nor where our top priorities should be.
Only practical thing is to make detection and response work great, global, and fast.
e.g. - The "finger in the dike" refers to the classic legend of the "Little Dutch Boy" who selflessly plugs a small leak in a dam with his finger, holding back the sea to save his town from a devastating flood. Small, temporary stopgap to a major, escalating problem.
You might be interested in this comprehensive strategy we put out today for tackling the full problem:
Written by the folks at Sentinel Bio. They have a lot of experience hands-on with this, e.g. their team recently red-teamed synthesis providers by trying to get a fragment of the Ebola virus shipped to their office.
It’s great to see AI leaders like Sam Altman, Dario Amodei, and Demis Hassabis calling for mandatory DNA synthesis screening, which is a no-brainer policy for preventing (AI-enabled) bioterrorism.
But fewer than 50 people in the world currently work on DNA security full-time.
We need a comprehensive plan and at least 5x as many people to secure the DNA supply chain before AI and biotech outpace us.
@jtmonrad and I spent the past two years developing a field strategy for how to do it.
Successfully defending against this risk (while still capturing innovation benefits) requires four things:
1. Coverage: More than 80% of synthetic DNA providers screen both orders and customers
2. Strategic ambiguity: a bad actor can’t easily tell which providers will screen their order
3. Access: legitimate customers can still order DNA cheaply and easily
4. Effectiveness: 90% of providers reliably catch dangerous sequences when red-teamed
We’re already seeing real momentum. Many DNA providers screen voluntarily, and governments in several countries are moving toward mandates. But that doesn’t mean the problem will be solved in time by default.
Our guide lays out exactly which projects we need to launch. We’re looking for founders, operators, and technical experts to own pieces of the solution. We’re also hiring a Senior Program Officer at Sentinel to drive this work. Get in touch if you or someone you know would be a strong fit! (links for EOI form and JD below)
Read our full field strategy in @IFP's Launch Sequence: https://ifp.org/how-to-secure-the-dna-supply-chain/

Fuck me, this isn't a science fiction novel.
Making pathogens is not that simple and it's the weapon of choice of the dumbest, most intellectual challenged thing you could possibly use AI for.
Suicide bombers looks like geniuses next to whatever moron thinks bioweapens are a smart idea.